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PROFITS AND PROFESSIONALISM
Deborah Rhode*
“Ethics pays” is a recurring refrain among commentators on professional
and business ethics. This should come as no surprise. In a culture
preoccupied with profit, appeals to self- interest may be the most
persuasive strategy. Yet if virtue were always its own reward, we would
surely see more of it. Promoting ethical values in professional workplaces
that are increasingly focused on the bottom line will require pushing
beyond the platitudes. We need more probing analysis of key questions.
To what extent does ethics pay? How well? Under what circumstances?
And most important, what can be done to increase the rate of return?
The following discussion explores those questions in three contexts.
The first involves workplace cultures.
How do we create more
organizational structures in which adhering to principles serves prudential
interests? A second area of inquiry involves pro bono service. If, as
research suggests, lawyers do well by doing good, how can we
communicate that message more effectively in work and educational
settings? A third cluster of issues concern quality of life. If, as a wide
array of studies indicate, balanced lives promote bottom lines, what will
convince more legal employers to adjust their policies accordingly?
I. DOES ETHICS PAY? WORKPLACE CULTURES AND PROFESSIONAL
VALUES
A widespread concern within the American bar is the perceived “decline
of the profession into a business.” About three quarters of surveyed
lawyers believe that the profession has become more “money conscious,”
and few regard the change as welcome. 1 The prevailing assumption is that
the priority on short-term profits undermines moral values and social

* Ernest W. McFarland Professor of Law, Director of the Center on Ethics, Stanford
University. B.A., J.D. Yale University.
1. Wes Hanson, Lawyers, Lawyers, Lawyers, Ethics: Easier Said Than Done,
JOSEPHSON INST. NEWSLETTER (Josephson Instit., Los Angeles, California), 1993, at 38;
Chris Klein, Big Firm Partners: Profession Sinking, NAT’L L.J., May 26, 1997, at A1
(eighty-two percent of surveyed large firm partners believed that the profession has changed
for the worse).
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responsibilities. 2 Growing financial pressures make it increasingly difficult
for lawyers to antagonize clients or supervisors by delivering unhappy
messages about what legal rules and legal ethics require. Greed may not be
the root of all evil, but it is surely responsible for much of the bar’s
complicity in financial, environmental, and health and safety disasters. 3
Yet while most commentary on legal ethics laments the bar’s
capitulation to market values, most commentary on business ethics insists
that those values, if properly assessed, are part of the solution, not the
problem. From this perspective, where individuals and institutions go
wrong is in focusing on short-term financial gains, which come at the
expense of larger long- term costs.
The legal and reputational
consequences of moral myopia often dwarf any immediate payoffs. Recent
work on moral leadership, particularly trade publications written by and for
managers, is peppered with reassuring homilies. If Aristotle Ran GM offers
a representative sample: a “climate of goodness . . . will always pay great
dividends,” “you can’t put a simple price on trust,” “unethical conduct
is . . . self-defeating or even self-destructive over the long run.” 4 A
dispassionate review of global business practices might suggest that
Aristotle would need to be running more than General Motors for this all to
be true. But no matter; in most of this commentary, a few spectacularly
expensive examples of moral meltdowns will do. Companies make “billion
dollar errors in judgment” by marketing unsafe products, fiddling with the
numbers in securities filings, or failing to report or discipline rogue
employees. 5 The moral of the story is always that if “values are lost,
everything is lost.” 6
Even more hardheaded leadership advice is often tempered with at least
lip service to the cost effectiveness of integrity and reminders that profits
are not an end in themselves. In their best selling book, In Search of

2. See sources cited in DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE 9, 216-17
n.18-19 (2000); ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993).
3. For example, see RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 7-10; David
Luban, Making Sense of Moral Meltdowns, Address at the Stanford Center on Ethics (Apr.
2004).
4. TOM MORRIS, IF ARISTOTLE RAN GENERAL MOTORS: THE NEW SOUL OF BUSINESS
127, 134, 157 (1997).
5. The error in judgment is a phrase applied to Salomon Brothers’ mishandling of a
trader who submitted false bids. For a thoughtful discussion, see LYNN SHARP PAINE,
VALUE SHIFT 9-12 (2003). Other commonly cited examples include fraud by Enron, Tyco,
and unsafe products by Johns Manville (asbestos) and H.R. Robbins (Dalkon Shields). See
Saul W. Gellerman, Why Good Managers Make Bad Ethical Choices, HARV. BUS. REV.,
July-Aug. 1986, at 85; JOHN DALLA COSTA, ETHICAL IMPERATIVE 241-43 (1998).
6. NOEL M. TICHY & ANDREW R. MCGILL, MICHIGAN BUSINESS SCHOOL GUIDE TO THE
ETHICAL CHALLENGE 84 (2003).
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Excellence, Thomas Peters and Robert Waterman insist that “[t]he top
companies make meaning, not just money.” 7 Jack Welch, a CEO best
known for his pursuit of profits, not ethics, similarly insists that “numbers
aren’t the vision, numbers are the product.” Although they cannot be
disregarded, they should not achieve “such priority that [leaders] fail to
deliver on the things that really matter to the company in the long run: its
culture . . . its values.” 8 In fact, that is useful advice, and had he followed it
his record might have been less mixed.9 But when and whether ethics pays
is much more complicated than this commentary generally suggests.
Social Responsibility and Financial Performance
A wide range of studies have attempted to address the relationship
between social responsibility and financial performance among businesses,
but surprisingly little work has focused on law firms. That work, discussed
below, has looked only to the correlation between support of pro bono
activities and profitability, not to broader issues of ethical culture. In the
business context, researchers have considered a wide range of measures,
but these efforts have been complicated by the absence of any consistent,
standardized criteria of social responsibility. No widely shared
methodologies are available for comparing organizations’ records on many
dimensions such as diversity, community relations, philanthropy, and
environmental stewardship. 10 Moreover, correlations do not establish
causation and any documented relationships between financial and social
performance may run in either or both directions. In some cases,
profitability may drive benevolence: organizations that are doing well have
more resources to invest in doing good. Alternatively, attention to moral
values may improve financial performance by improving relations with
various stakeholders: employees, clients, customers, suppliers, and
community members. These factors also may be interrelated, and mediated
by other variables. Social performance could be both a cause and

7. THOMAS J. PETERS & ROBERT H. WATERMAN, IN
FROM AMERICA’S BEST-RUN COMPANIES 279 (1982); see
AND EXCELLENCE 44, 47 (1992).

SEARCH OF EXCELLENCE: LESSONS
also ROBERT C. SOLOMON, ETHICS

8. ROBERT SLATER, JACK WELCH ON LEADERSHIP 51, 55 (2004). For a discussion of
Welch’s ethical record, see id. at 133-39; Michael E. Brown & Linda K. Treviño, Is ValuesBased Leadership Ethical Leadership?, in EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON VALUES IN
ORGANIZATIONS 151, 166 (Stephen W. Gilliland et al. eds., 2003); Gellerman, supra note 5,
at 90.
9. See sources cited supra, note 8.
10. STEPHEN J. GARONE, THE LINK BETWEEN CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP AND FINANCIAL
PERFORMANCE 3, 5-9 (1999); Sandra A. Waddock & Samuel B. Graves, The Corporate
Social Performance-Financial Performance Link, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 303, 304 (1997).
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consequence of financial performance, but the strength of either
relationship could be significantly affected by additional industry-specific
factors. 11
Despite these methodological complications, the overall direction of
research findings is instructive. Some studies have compared the social
performance of organizations with high and low financial returns.12 Other
surveys have looked for relationships between social and financial
performance among all Standard and Poors 500 companies. 13 Although
results vary, few studies find a purely negative correlation. In one
overview of ninety-five surveys, only four found a negative relationship;
fifty-five found a positive relationship; twenty-two found no relationship
and eighteen found a mixed relationship. 14
A similar pattern emerges from qualitative and quantitative research that
addresses the impact of specific ethical behaviors on financial results or on
measures likely to affect such results, such as employee relations and
public reputation. The vast majority of these studies find significant
positive relationships. For example, companies with stated commitments
to ethical behavior have a higher mean financial performance than
companies lacking such commitments. 15 Employees who view their
organization as supporting fair and ethical conduct, and its leadership as
caring about ethical issues, observe less unethical behavior and perform
better along a range of dimensions; they are more willing to share
information and knowledge, and to “go the extra mile” in meeting job
requirements. 16 Employees also show more concern for the customer or
client when employers show more concern for them, and workers who feel
justly treated respond in kind; they are less likely to engage in petty
11. See Waddock & Graves, supra note 10, at 304.
12. See PAINE, VALUE SHIFT, supra note 5, at 52; see also GARONE, supra note 10, at 6;
JOSHUA DANIEL MARGOLIS & JAMES PATRICK WALSH, PEOPLE AND PROFITS? THE SEARCH
FOR A LINK BETWEEN A COMPANY’S SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE (2001); Elisabet
Garriega & Domenec Mele, Corporate Social Responsibility Theories: Mapping the
Territory, 53 BUS. ETHICS J. 51 (2004).
13. See Waddock & Graves, supra note 10, at 307-16.
14. MARGOLIS & WALSH, supra note 12, at 10-11.
15. See the studies discussed in Elena G. Procario-Foley & David F. Bean, Institutions
of Higher Education: Cornerstones in Building Ethical Organizations, 6 TEACHING BUS.
ETHICS 101, 102 (2002).
16. See LINDA KLEBE TREVIÑO & GARY R. WEAVER, MANAGING ETHICS IN BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS: SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES 233 (2003) [hereinafter TREVINO &
WEAVER, MANAGING ETHICS]; studies cited in PAINE, VALUE SHIFT, supra note 5, at 42-44;
Kim S. Cameron et al., Exploring the Relationships Between Organizational Virtuousness
and Performance, 47 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 766 passim (2004); Tom R. Tyler & Steven L.
Blader, Social Identity and Fairness Judgments, in EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON VALUES IN
ORGANIZATIONS 67, 69-75 (Stephen W. Gilliland et al. eds., 2003).
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dishonesty such as pilfering, fudging on hours and expenses, or misusing
business opportunities. 17 The financial payoffs are obvious. Employee
satisfaction improves customer satisfaction and retention, enhances
workplace trust, furthers cooperation and innovation, and saves substantial
costs resulting from misconduct and surveillance designed to prevent it.18
Such findings are consistent with well-documented principles of
individual behavior and group dynamics. People care deeply about
“organizational justice” and perform better when they believe that their
workplace deals justly with its stakeholders.19 Workers also respond to
cues from peers and leaders. Virtue begets virtue, and observing moral
behavior by others promotes similar conduct.20 Employers reap the
rewards in higher morale, recruitment and retention.21
Ethical Reputation, Ethical Counseling, and Financial Value
A reputation for ethical conduct also has financial value. In the legal
profession, it can attract clients and employees, and build constructive
relationships with opposing counsel and government regulators. One of
lawyers’ most crucial contributions involves helping clients live up to their
best instincts and deepest values. Even highly profit-driven businesses
often need and want counselors who can provide a “corporate
conscience.” 22 In that capacity, lawyers can help clients evaluate shortterm economic objectives in light of long-term concerns that include
maintaining a reputation for social responsibility and managerial
integrity. 23 Neither lawyers’ nor clients’ long-term interests are served by
eroding the institutional frameworks on which law and markets ultimately
depend. Norms like good faith, honesty, and fair dealing are essential for

17. TREVIÑO & WEAVER, MANAGING ETHICS, supra note 16, at 233; PAINE, VALUE
SHIFT, supra note 5, at 45; Robert B. Cialdini, Social Influence and the Triple Tumor of
Organizational Dishonesty, in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS
ETHICS 53-56 (David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996).
18. GARONE, supra note 10, at 11; Cialdini, supra note 17, at 56.
19. Tyler & Blader, supra note 16, at 67-79; PAINE, VALUE SHIFT, supra note 5, at 46.
20. PAINE, VALUE SHIFT, supra note 5, at 45-49; Cameron et al., supra note 16, at 773.
21. GARONE, supra note 10, at 11; PAINE, VALUE SHIFT, supra note 5, at 45; Cameron et
al., supra note 16, at 770-83.
22. See RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 65; Deborah L. Rhode,
Ethics in Counseling, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 591, 608 (2003); Robert Gordon, Why Lawyers Can’t
Just Be Hired Guns, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS’ ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND
REGULATION 42 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000); Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall,
Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1161
(1958).
23. Robert Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 26-28, 71-74
(1988).
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efficient commercial markets and regulatory systems. These values require
some shared restraint in the pursuit of short-term interests. Legal processes
present frequent opportunities for obstruction, obfuscation, and
overreaching.
Lawyers who take advantage of such opportunities
undermine expectations of trust and cooperation. These expectations are
common goods on which both lawyers and clients ultimately depend. In
the short term, free riders can profit by violating norms that others respect.
But these values cannot survive in contexts where deviance becomes
common. Over the long run, a single-minded pursuit of short-term selfinterests is likely to prove self-defeating for both the profession and the
public. 24
Business ethics commentators have made similar points, and have
attempted to quantify the reputational costs of organizational misconduct
and social irresponsibility. 25 As they note, these costs can be substantial,
and can dramatically affect market share and stock value.26 According to
some studies, most of the decline in shareholder value following allegations
or proof of illegal behavior reflects injuries to reputation, not prospective
fines or liability damages. 27 A substantial body of research also suggests
that the goodwill flowing from an ethical reputation can buffer
organizations during periods of difficulty resulting from financial,
consumer product, or environmental scandals. 28 A celebrated case in point
is Johnson & Johnson’s decision to recall Tylenol after an incident of
product tampering. It was a socially responsible decision that was highly
risky in financial terms; pulling the capsules cost more than $100 million,
and many experts at the time believed that it would doom one of the
company’s most profitable products. But Johnson & Johnson’s reputation
for integrity, reinforced by the recall decision, maintained public
confidence, and the product bounced back with new safety features and no

24. See id. at 54.
25. CHARLES J. FOMBRUN, REPUTATION: REALIZING VALUE FROM THE CORPORATE IMAGE
85 (1996); GRAHAME DOWLING, CREATING CORPORATE REPUTATIONS: IDENTITY, IMAGE,
AND PERFORMANCE 219 (2001); PAINE, V ALUE SHIFT, supra note 5, at 48-49; Cialdini, supra
note 17. See also Jennifer Reese, America’s Most Admired Corporations, FORTUNE, Feb. 8,
1993, at 44 (noting that admired corporations tend to have good ethical records); PAINE,
VALUE SHIFT, supra note 5, at 48-49.
26. PAINE, VALUE SHIFT, supra note 5, at 49; Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr.,
The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear From Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & ECON.
757 (1993).
27. Karpoff & Lott, supra note 26, at 760.
28. PAINE, VALUE SHIFT, supra note 5, at 49; Cameron et al., supra note 16, at 773;
William J. Holstein, The Snowball Effect of Volunteer Work, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2004, at
C12.
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long-term damage. 29
Unhappy endings from socially irresponsible decisions also abound. A
notorious example of a corporate public relations disaster that could have
been averted was Royal Dutch Shell’s decision to sink an obsolete oil rig
with potentially radioactive residues in the North Sea despite strong
environmental protests. The resulting adverse publicity and consumer
boycotts took a huge financial toll.30 Survey data from the United States
and abroad also reveal that most individuals believe that companies should
set high ethical standards and contribute to broader social goals. For
example, between one-third and two-thirds of American consumers report
that they seriously consider corporate citizenship when making purchases,
and a quarter recall boycotting a product because of disapproval of the
Corporate lawyers who take seriously their
company’s actions.31
obligation to represent the organization, not just its current managers, can
help insure that these long term reputational costs receive consideration in
board decision making.
When Ethics Doesn’t Pay: The Case for Values
Examples of the high costs of moral myopia are not uncommon;
professional and business ethics texts offer countless variations on the same
theme. But the reasons why the examples are so abundant also point up the
problems with “ethics pays” as an all-purpose prescription. As Harvard
Business School Professor Lynne Sharp Paine puts it, a more accurate
guide would be “ethics counts.” 32 Whether doing good results in doing
well depends on the institutional and social context. In the corporate
setting, Paine notes, the “financial case for values” is strongest when
certain conditions are met:
1. legal and regulatory systems are effective in enforcing ethical
29. PAINE, VALUE SHIFT, supra note 5, at 30; JAMES BURKE, A CAREER IN AMERICAN
BUSINESS (Harv. Bus. Sch. Case No. 389-177, 390-030, 1989); DALLA COSTA, supra note 5,
at 217.
30. PAINE, VALUE SHIFT, supra note 5, at 20-22; Michael D. Watkins & Max H.
Bazerman, Predictable Surprises: The Disasters You Should Have Seen Coming, HARV.
BUS. REV., Mar. 2003, at 72.
31. HILL & KNOWLTON, 2001 CORPORATE CITIZEN WATCH SURVEY (2001) (one third);
Caring in the Community, MGMT. TODAY, Mar. 1995, at 19-20; Ronald Alsop, The Best
Corporate Reputations in America: Johnson & Johnson (Think Babies!) Turns Up Tops,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 1999, at B1 (boycott). In one international poll, a fifth reported
rewarding or punishing a company for its social performance and another fifth considered
doing so. ENVIRONICS INT’L, LTD., IN COOPERATION WITH THE PRINCE OF WALES BUSINESS
LEADERS FORUM & THE CONFERENCE BOARD, THE MILLENNIUM POLL ON CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY (1999); see also PAINE, VALUE SHIFT, supra note 5, at 82, 111.
32. Id. at 134.
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norms;
2. individuals have choice in employment, investment, and
consumer decisions and are well informed concerning those
choices; and
3. the society expects organizations to operate within an ethical
framework. 33
When “ethics pays,” it is generally because an informed public wants it
to, and because leaders in business, government, and the professions have
designed effective incentive and compliance systems.
It is, however, naive and misleading to suggest that these systems are
always in place. 34 In law, problems arise not only because legal and ethical
enforcement systems are highly imperfect, but also because the public is
ambivalent in its desires. Ethics is what clients want in other peoples’
lawyers. In their own attorneys, zealous advocacy in pursuit of short-term
interests often appears preferable.35 As a consequence, many practice areas
end up with differential markets in morality. A tidy living flows from
conduct euphemistically described in terms like “bombing,” “hard ball,” or
“scorched earth.”
A further problem with “ethics pays” as the core argument for ethical
practice is that it is ultimately self-defeating. To make the case for
“values” turn solely on instrumental considerations is to reinforce patterns
of reasoning that undermine ethical commitments. We respect moral
conduct most when it occurs despite, not because of, self-interest. What
defines ethical behavior is a commitment to do right whether or not it
carries a cost. Our challenge as a profession and a society is not only to
find ways of minimizing that cost, but also to respect and reinforce
adherence to fundamental principles when they come at a price.
II. PRO BONO CONTRIBUTIONS: DOING WELL BY DOING GOOD
Similar points are applicable to charitable contributions. Pro bono
activities and financial support have many payoffs for lawyers, legal
employers, and the legal profession generally. But there is also value in
encouraging such contributions when they are motivated by intrinsic rather
than extrinsic rewards.

33. Id. at 76.
34. For examples, see Amar Bhide & Howard H. Stevenson, Why Be Honest If Honesty
Doesn’t Pay, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 121.
35. See RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 6-7; A.B.A., PERCEPTIONS
OF THE UNITED STATES JUSTICE SYSTEM 59 (1999).

CHRISTENSEN_RHODE

2005]

2/3/2011 10:10 PM

PROFITS AND PROFESSIONALISM

109

Benefits to Lawyers
A wide array of research, both on lawyers and on the public generally,
finds that benefiting others also benefits ourselves. Volunteering is
correlated with both physical and mental health. Compared with the
population generally, people who regularly assist others apart from family
and friends have longer lives, less pain, stress, and depression, and greater
self-esteem. 36 Volunteers also report a sense of physical well being, both
immediately after helping and when the service is remembered, and are
more likely to be happy with their lives.37 One of the most commonly cited
benefits is that such assistance makes individuals “feel better” about
themselves; other frequently noted rewards include opportunities to
“broaden horizons,” “do something worthwhile,” build social relationships,
and gain educational or employment-related experience. 38
Although the correlation between volunteer activities and well-being
does not establish a causal relationship, the evidence available suggests that
such a relationship exists. That evidence includes the high frequency of
individuals’ subjective experience of benefits, the consistent association of
volunteering with objective measures of health, and the biological
indications of a “helper’s high.” 39 Although the neurological basis for
heightened physiological well-being is not well understood, some research
suggests that caregiving activities reduce stress, which improves the
functioning of the immune system and triggers the release of endorphins
that produce pleasurable physical sensations.40 So too, volunteer work, like
other forms of organizational activity, tends to reduce participants’ sense of
isolation and increases their sense of efficacy and self-esteem. 41
For lawyers, pro bono involvement brings this same range of
professional and personal rewards. Particularly for young attorneys, such
36. See research summarized in ALAN LUKS WITH PEGGY PAYNE, THE HEALING POWER
DOING GOOD: THE HEALTH AND SPIRITUAL BENEFITS OF HELPING OTHERS xi-xii, 17-18,
45-54, 60 (2d ed. 2001); John Wilson & Marc Musick, The Effects of Volunteering, 62 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 141, 142-43 (1999); Marc A. Musick et al., Volunteering and Mortality
Among Older Adults: Findings from a National Sample, 548 J. GERONTOLOGY S173, S178
(1999).
37. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY 331 (2000); LUKS WITH PAYNE, supra note 36, at xi-xiii, 17-18, 118-19; John
M. Darley, Altruism and Prosocial Behavior Research: Reflections and Prospects, in
PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 312-27 (Margaret S. Clark ed., 1991).
38. Ram A. Cnaan & Robin S. Goldberg-Glen, Measuring Motivation in Human
Services, 27 J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 269, 275-79 (1991); FRANCIE OSTROWER, WHY THE
WEALTHY GIVE: THE CULTURE OF ELITE PHILANTHROPY 13-14 (1995).
39. See sources cited in supra notes 18 and 19.
40. LUKS WITH PAYNE, supra note 36, at 47-55.
41. Wilson & Musick, supra note 36, at 153-55.
OF
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work can also provide valuable training, contacts, trial experience, and
leadership opportunities. 42 Through pro bono programs, lawyers can
develop new areas of expertise and demonstrate marketable skills.
Participation in community groups, charitable organizations, high visibility
litigation, and other public interest activities allows attorneys to expand
their perspectives, enhance their reputations, and attract paying clients.43
Lawyers also report the same kinds of psychological rewards from
service that motivates other volunteer activity. Pro bono work can be a
way to “give back,” to promote social justice, and to make an immediate
positive difference in someone’s life. 44 For most private practitioners,
whose paid work is predominantly commercial, volunteer activity allows
them to express the values that directed them to legal careers in the first
instance. American Bar Association (“ABA”) surveys consistently find
that lawyers’ greatest dissatisfaction with their practice is a lack of
“contribution to the social good.” 45 Pro bono work can provide that
contribution. As the pro bono director of one Wall Street firm noted,
lawyers “talk about their [pro bono] work in a way they’ve never done

42. Esther Lardent, Pro Bono Work Is Good for Business, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 19, 2001, at
B20; W. Terence Walsh, Pro Bono 2000: A Bridge Over Troubled Waters, GA. B.J., June
2000, at 12, 15; John Ryan, Duty Calls, CA. L. BUS. Feb. 12, 2001, at 17; Daniel Becker,
The Many Faces of Pro Bono, WASH. LAW., May 2001, at 22, 30; The Role of the Private
Bar and Pro Bono Service in Meeting the Legal Needs of the Twenty-First Century, 3 N.Y.
CITY L. REV. 171, 186 (2000); Lawyers of This Year, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 25, 2000, at A24;
Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Stricture and Structure: The Social and Cultural Context of Pro
Bono Work in Wall Street Firms, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1689, 1693-94 (2002); Robert
Granfield & Thomas Koenig, “It’s Hard To Be a Human Being and a Lawyer”: Young
Attorneys and the Confrontation with Ethical Ambiguity in Legal Practice, 105 W. VA. L.
REV. 495 (2003).
43. John B. Heinz et al., Lawyers’ Roles in Voluntary Associations: Declining Social
Capital?, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 597, 599 (2001); Jill Schachner Chanen, Pro Bono’s
Pros—and Cons: Rewards Are Great But It Takes a Deft Balance of Time and Effort,
A.B.A. J., May 1998, at 80; Donald W. Hoagland, Community Service Makes Better
Lawyers, in THE LAW FIRM AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 104, 109 (1995); Jack W. Londen, The
Impact of Pro Bono Work on Law Firm Economics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 925 (l996);
Thomas J. Brannan, Pro Bono: By Choice or By Chance?, 84 ILL. B.J., Sept. 1996, at 481;
Ronald J. Tabak, Integration of Pro Bono Into Law Firm Practice, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
931, 932 (1996).
44. Ruth M. Bond, Taking Time Out to Help Those in Need with Legal Burdens Brings
Satisfaction, Pride, S.F. DAILY J., Jan. 15, 2002, at 4; Tanya Neiman, Nothing Cures
Like . . ., 26 S.F. ATT’Y, Feb.-Mar. 2000, at 44, 45; Walsh, supra note 42; Becker, supra
note 42, at 22; Evelyn Apgar, General Counsel, Pro Bono Gripes Galore, 6 N.J. LAW., Nov.
1997, at 3.
45. A.B.A., YOUNG LAWYERS DIV., CAREER SATISFACTION SURVEY 20 (2000)
[hereinafter A.B.A. 2000 CAREER SATISFACTION SURVEY]; A.B.A., YOUNG LAWYERS DIV.,
CAREER SATISFACTION SURVEY (1995) [hereinafter A.B.A. 1995 CAREER SATISFACTION
SURVEY].
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before. People say, ‘This is the best day of my life.’” 46
Benefits to Legal Employers
By promoting participants’ professional growth, reputation, and
satisfaction, support of volunteer service also promotes the interests of their
employers. Research on private-sector organizations finds that employee
loyalty and morale are significantly greater when organizations are
involved in their communities, and that employer-giving levels correlate
positively with public image and financial performance.47 Of course, as
noted earlier, correlations do not establish causation, and it is unclear
whether outstanding financial performance drives charitable contributions
or the other way around. Alternatively, causal relationships might run in
both directions. High-earning organizations have the most resources to
invest in unpaid public service. They may also be in the best position to
reap reputational rewards from such efforts, because they can afford to
pursue and publicize their efforts.
For legal employers, strong pro bono programs can produce further,
although hard to quantify, benefits in terms of retention, recruitment, and
job performance.48 Lack of career development opportunities is one of the
main reasons that lawyers change jobs. 49 Although relatively few surveyed

46. Vivia Chen, Going Corporate, AM. LAW., Sept. 2003, at 94 (quoting William Fogg).
47. Shari Caudron, Volunteerism; And the Bottom Line, INDUSTRY WK., Feb. 1994, at
13, 18; Craig Smith, The New Corporate Philanthropy, 74 HARV. BUS. REV., May-June
1994, at 105; Barbara R. Bartkus et al., Governance and Corporate Philanthropy:
Restraining Robin Hood?, 41 BUS. & SOC’Y 319 (2002); CATHLEEN WILD, CORPORATE
VOLUNTEER PROGRAMS: BENEFITS TO BUSINESS, REPORT NO. 1029, 9, 11, 20-21 (1993);
William J. Holstein, The Snowball Effect of Volunteer Work, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2004, at
C12; GARONE, supra note 10, at 11; Jan Larson, Sweet Charity, 2 MARKETING TOOLS 3, 68
(May 1995); Bill Shaw & Frederick R. Post, A Moral Basis for Corporate Philanthropy, 12
J. BUS. ETHICS 745, 746, 749 (1993); Nancy J. Knauer, The Paradox of Corporate Giving:
Tax Expenditures, the Nature of the Corporation, and the Social Construction of Charity, 44
DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 57-60 (1994).
48. Londen, supra note 43, at 925; John Ryan, Rescue Mission, CA. L. BUS., Feb. 12,
2001, at 15 (quoting Jack Londen); Carrie Johnson, As the Need for Free Legal Helps Soars
Amid Cutbacks in Federal Programs, Some Law Firms Are Responding by Moving FullTime Pro Bono Lawyers Into Their Ranks, LEG. TIMES, June 30, 1997, at S44; Memorandum
to New York Partners of Clifford Chance Re. Associates Concerns (Oct. 15, 2002) (noting
that firm’s unsupportive attitude toward pro bono was a “significant minus” in recruiting
and
adversely affected
some
associates’
perception
of firm
culture),
http://www.lawcost.com/clifchancememo.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2005).
49. JUDITH N. COLLINS, NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW P LACEMENT FOUNDATION (“NALP”), THE
LATERAL LAWYER: WHY THEY LEAVE AND WHAT MAY MAKE THEM STAY 24, 43-52, 77
(2001); AUSTIN G. ANDERSON & ARTHUR G. GREENE, THE EFFECTIVE ASSOCIATE TRAINING
PROGRAM: IMPROVING FIRM PERFORMANCE, PROFITABILITY AND PROSPECTIVE PARTNERS
(1999).
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lawyers cite inadequate support for pro bono work as a major reason for
leaving a position, the opportunity for such work may be an important part
of why other lawyers stay; it can significantly enhance the quality of their
professional lives. 50 As one winner of a bar pro bono award noted, such
activity is an “enormous morale booster for the entire firm.” 51 “Everyone
feels that they touched a life . . . No office picnics or parties can give you
that.” 52
Public opinion research also confirms the reputational value of pro bono
work. In one representative survey, which asked what could improve the
image of lawyers, the response most often chosen was their provision of
free legal services to the needy; two-thirds of those surveyed indicated that
it would improve their opinion of the profession. 53 In another poll, almost
half of those responding thought that lawyers did not contribute enough to
their communities through donations of time, legal services, or money.
Only a quarter disagreed. 54 Legal employers who make substantial
contributions can help challenge such perceptions, while establishing
themselves as exceptionally responsible citizens.
The Costs of Cost-Benefit Justifications
As is true with other ethical commitments, to justify pro bono
involvement in solely instrumental terms may undermine its moral
significance and distort charitable priorities. The problems are welldocumented in corporate philanthropy, where organizational leaders often
use business giving as a form of “social currency” that enhances status and
self-image rather than effectively addresses social needs. 55 The demand for
50. JUDITH N. COLLINS, supra note 49, at 156, Table A-22 (only 7.2 percent of lawyers
cited lack of credit for pro bono work). For the value of pro bono programs in retaining
lawyers by increasing their workplace satisfaction, see sources cited in notes 48-49 supra.
51. Talcott J. Franklin, Practical Pro Bono: How Public Source Can Enhance Your
Practice, 10 S.C. LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 14, 19.
52. Franklin, supra note 51, at 19-20.
53. PETER D. HART RESEARCH ASSOC., INC., A SURVEY OF ATTITUDES NATIONWIDE
TOWARD LAWYERS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 18 (Jan. 1993); see also Gary A. Hengstler, Vox
Populi, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1993, at 61 (citing survey data finding that almost half of those
surveyed believed that providing free legal services would improve the profession’s image).
A survey by the Oregon bar found when individuals were asked what information might
cause them to have a higher opinion of the legal profession, they gave top ratings to
knowledge that lawyers had given free legal advice to mass disaster victims and had made
financial contributions to community legal services organizations. Karen Garst, Reporting
on Survey, Part II, OR. ST. B. BULL., Dec. 1996, at 39, 46.
54. A.B.A., PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 35, at 59 (1999).
55. MICHAEL USEEM, THE INNER CIRCLE 121-26 (1984); Usha C. V. Haley, Corporate
Contributions as Managerial Masques: Reframing Corporate Contributions as Strategies to
Influence Society, 28 J. MGMT. STUD. 485, 494 (1991).
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“value added” from charitable donations has even led some companies to
spend more on advertising their good deeds than on the donations
themselves. 56
So too, in the legal context, viewing pro bono programs largely as a way
of training junior attorneys or advancing reputational interests may ill-serve
client or societal concerns. Many law firms make inadequate efforts to
supervise pro bono work or to ensure that participants have “cultural
competence” in assisting low-income minority clients.57 Other legal
employers prevent attorneys from representing causes that might offend
current or potential paying clients. 58 Yet these are precisely the causes
most in need of assistance. Restrictions on government-funded legal aid
programs exclude broad categories of clients who have nowhere else to go,
such as prisoners, undocumented aliens, women seeking abortions, or
school desegregation plaintiffs.59 Without pro bono assistance, groups that
are most politically vulnerable are legally vulnerable as well. As bar codes
and commentary acknowledge, one of lawyers’ most crucial roles involves
representation of causes likely to offend political clients.60 Obvious
examples involve the pro bono counsel who defended alleged Communists
during the McCarthy movement, southern civil rights workers during the
1950s and 1960s, and seemingly pathological death-row defendants in
recently successful DNA-based appeals. These attorneys often paid a
substantial professional price. We are all richer because of it.
By contrast, when charitable assistance is viewed primarily in
instrumental terms, it often ends up targeting those least in need of charity.
Traditionally, most of lawyers’ unpaid work has gone not to public interest
and low-income groups, but to friends, family members, and organizations
like symphonies or Jaycees, which serve primarily middle- and upperincome individuals.61 Many lawyers also have defined pro bono service to
include matters where a fee turns out to be uncollectible.62 No
comprehensive data are available on how much unpaid assistance attorneys
56. Mary Lyn Stoll, The Ethics of Marketing Good Corporate Conduct, 41 J. BUS.
ETHICS 121, 124 (2002).
57. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE: PUBLIC SERVICE
AND THE PROFESSIONS 40-41, 136 (2005) [hereinafter RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE].
58. Id. at 146-48; Esther F. Lardent, Positional Conflict in the Pro Bono Context:
Ethical Considerations and Market Forces, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2279, 2280 (1999).
59. 45 C.F.R. § 1610-42 (1999); DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3-4, 105
(2004).
60. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY E.C. 2-27 (1986); RHODE, IN THE
INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 54.
61. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE, supra note 57, at 14.
62. Id. at 19; CARROLL SERON, THE BUSINESS OF PRACTICING LAW 129-33 (1996); Gary
Spencer, Pro Bono Data Show Little Improvement, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 5, 1999, at 1.
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now provide or which clients benefit. Only three states require lawyers to
report pro bono work, only one (Florida) makes the information public, and
even it does not identify recipients. What research is available, including
my own national survey of some 3000 lawyers, suggests that the American
bar averages less than half an hour a week and fifty cents a day in pro bono
contributions, as lawyers define the term. 63 Little of that support benefits
low-income individuals. 64
Large numbers of lawyers are also unhappy with their pro bono
opportunities. American Bar Association surveys of young lawyers
consistently have found that their greatest source of workplace
dissatisfaction is a lack of “contribution to the social good.”65 So too,
when a recent joint study by the National Association of Law Placement
Foundation and the American Bar Foundation asked relatively new entrants
to the profession to rate their satisfaction with sixteen aspects of practice,
they ranked pro bono opportunities second to last. 66
In my own survey, about half of lawyers reported dissatisfaction with the
amount of their pro bono work. 67 The central problem involved employer
policies that failed to value public service in practice as well as principle.
Only a quarter of surveyed lawyers’ workplaces (twenty-five percent) fully
counted pro bono work toward billable hours. 68 Such findings are
consistent with other recent survey data, and they reflect a culture that
undermines public service commitments. 69 In effect, as many lawyers
63. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE, supra note 57, at 20. The most recent American
Bar Association survey, which found that two thirds of lawyers averaged thirty-nine hours
on pro bono work per year is not inconsistent with that finding, given that the survey used
an extremely broad definition of pro bono work. That definition, based on Model Rule 6.1,
included participation in activities “for improving the legal system or the legal profession
through groups such as bar associations or judicial committees.” A.B.A., SUPPORTING
JUSTICE: A REPORT ON THE PRO BONO WORK OF AMERICA’S LAWYERS 4, 10 (Aug. 2005).
According to the American Lawyer’s most recent survey of the 200 most profitable firms,
only thirty-six percent of lawyers performed twenty hours or more of pro bono work. Aric
Press, Brother, Can You Spare 20 Hours, AM. LAW., Sept. 1, 2005, available at
http://www.americanlawyer.com.
64. Id. at 14, 19; Judith L. Maute, Pro Bono Publico in Oklahoma, Time for Change, 53
OKLA. L. REV. 527, 562-63 (2000).
65. A.B.A. 2000 CAREER SATISFACTION SURVEY, supra note 45, at 28; A.B.A. 1995
CAREER SATISFACTION SURVEY, supra note 45.
66. NALP & THE AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, AFTER THE J.D.: FIRST RESULTS OF A
NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS 49 (2004) [hereinafter NALP & THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, AFTER THE J.D.].
67. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE, supra note 57, at 148.
68. Id. at 138.
69. In an American Lawyer survey, only twenty-eight percent of respondents’ firms
credited time on pro bono activities toward minimum billable hour requirements.
Commission AmLaw 100 and Law Firm Questionnaires, AM. LAWYER, Aug. 2002, at 52.
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noted, pro bono service was permissible only if it occurred “outside the
normal work hours.” 70 Given what passes for “normal” in many firms, the
price of public service is often prohibitive. Lawyers with substantial
family obligations were particularly likely to see non-billable work as a
“luxury” they could not afford. 71
Other limitations on pro bono participation arise from informal
workplace norms and practices. Only about half of lawyers’ firms
subsidized all the costs of pro bono matters. 72 Only ten percent of
surveyed lawyers indicated that their employers valued such work as much
as billable hours in promotion and compensation decisions.73 Almost a
fifth believed that pro bono contributions were not viewed as important,
and almost half felt they were negatively viewed. 74 In many firms,
attitudes ranged from active discouragement to not-so-benign neglect. In
essence, “money has been the absolute bottom line, so pro bono . . . is not
rewarded.” 75
A related problem involves the kind of pro bono involvement that
employers permit. Almost half of the lawyers in my sample were
dissatisfied with the type of pro bono work permitted. 76 Many of these
lawyers ended up with unpaid work that they did not consider pro bono,
such as favors for clients and their relatives, or the personal legal matters of
partners and their families. 77 Such work seldom yields the kind of
experience, visibility, and contacts that has career benefits.78 Other
attorneys were limited to services for the “pet organizations” of certain
partners, or work that would benefit the “corporate image.” 79 Not only do
these priorities discourage involvement and skew the allocation of scarce
charitable resources, they also undermine the legitimacy of pro bono
programs. That risk is particularly great when lawyers’ self-interests are
implicated. As one attorney observed, “Right now this firm’s idea of pro

70. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE, supra note 57, at 138.
71. Id. at 138; see also Bryant G. Garth, Noblesse Oblige as an Alternative Career
Strategy, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 93, 110 (2004) (noting time constraints that limit women’s
participation).
72. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE, supra note 57, at 139.
73. Id. at 140.
74. Id. (eighteen percent reported that pro bono activities were viewed as not important,
and forty-four percent believed that they were negatively viewed).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 148 (forty-three percent were dissatisfied).
77. Id.
78. Garth, supra note 71, at 105.
79. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE, supra note 57, at 148.
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bono is to handle a partner’s personal matters for free. It’s a joke.” 80
The devaluation of public service in many workplaces represents a
missed opportunity for all concerned. A preoccupation with short-term
profits overlooks the long-term benefits to lawyers, their employers, and
their communities. And to view unpaid work in primarily instrumental
terms, as a way to provide training for practitioners or favors for friends
and families, undermines the values on which charitable commitment
depends.
III. BALANCED LIVES AND BOTTOM LINES
A final casualty of the bottom-line orientation of legal workplaces
involves quality of life. Over the last half century, billable hours for
lawyers have dramatically risen, but what has not changed are the number
of hours in the day. 81 A 1960s ABA Lawyers’ Handbook defined a
“normal” schedule as “approximately 1,300 fee earning hours per year.”82
“Normal” now is closer to 2000 hours. 83 To charge honestly at current
levels often requires working sixty-hour weeks and the obligations in many
organizations are even higher. 84 As one associate logging those hours
responded to a question about her quality of life, “We can’t live like this.
This is not a life.” 85 Most surveyed lawyers report that they do not have
sufficient time for themselves and their families. 86 Only a third to a half
believe that their employers support balanced lives and flexible workplace
arrangements. 87 Only a fifth of mothers who are working full time

80. Id.
81. For earlier work that makes similar points concerning balanced lives, see RHODE, IN
THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 10, 216 n.21; Deborah L. Rhode, Balanced
Lives: Changing the Culture of Legal Practice, A.B.A. COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE
PROFESSION
(2002)
[hereinafter
RHODE,
Balanced
Lives],
available
at
http://abanet.org/women (last visited Oct. 15, 2005); Deborah L. Rhode, Balanced Lives for
Lawyers, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2207 (2002).
82. WOMEN’S BAR ASS’N OF MASS., MORE THAN PART-TIME: THE EFFECT OF REDUCED
HOURS ARRANGEMENTS ON THE RETENTION, RECRUITMENT, AND SUCCESS OF WOMEN
ATTORNEYS IN LAW FIRMS 7 (2000).
83. See sources cited in RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 10.
84. Id. at 35; Patrick Schlitz, On Being A Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of An
Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 58 VAND. L. REV. 871, 891-95 (1999).
85. Cynthia Fuchs Epstein et al., Glass Ceilings and Open Doors: Women’s
Advancement in the Legal Profession, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 385 (l995).
86. A.B.A. 2000 CAREER SATISFACTION SURVEY, supra note 45, at 28 (Table 20).
87. Gregory J. Mazores, Association Retention for Law Firms: What Are Your Lawyers
Saying About You?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 903, 905 (2002) (finding that a third of associates
believe that lawyers at their firms are encouraged to create a balance between work and life
outside it). See figures compiled by Cythnia Fuchs Epstein et al., THE PART-TIME
PARADOX: TIME NORMS, PROFESSIONAL LIVES, FAMILY, AND GENDER 5 (1999) and by the
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schedules are satisfied with the amount of time that they have for
childcare. 88 Particularly in large firms, where sweatshop schedules are
most common, some attorneys report finding it “difficult to have a cat,
much less a family.” 89
The Costs of Excessive Hours and Inflexible Schedules
The adverse effects of excessive hours, both to lawyers and their
employers, are well documented. For lawyers, overwork is a leading cause
of disproportionately high rates of stress, substance abuse, reproductive
dysfunction, and mental health difficulties. 90 These, in turn, contribute to
performance and disciplinary problems that carry a cost for employers and
clients as well as practitioners.91 Bleary, burned-out lawyers can seldom
deliver efficient service on a sustained basis. So too, excessive hourly
demands contribute to widespread abuses such as meter running and
fudging time sheets. 92
National Association of Law Placement, discussed in Martha Neil, Lawyers Shun Firms’
Offers of Part-Time Work, CHI. L. BULL., Dec. 18, 2000, at 1 (suggesting that about half of
surveyed practitioners doubt that their employers truly support flexible workplace
arrangements).
88. JEAN E. WALLACE, LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNSEL, RESEARCH REPORT NO RR-0002, JUGGLING IT ALL: EXPLORING LAWYERS’ WORK, HOME, AND FAMILY DEMANDS AND
COPING STRATEGIES 15 (2002).
89. SUZANNE NOSSEL & ELIZABETH WESTFALL, PRESUMED EQUAL: WHAT AMERICA’S
TOP WOMEN LAWYERS REALLY THINK ABOUT THEIR FIRMS 295 (1998).
90. Nancy Dart & Marilyn Tucker, Workaholic Lawyers, WASH. LAW., 1990, at 36, 4041. An estimated one-third of American attorneys suffer from depression or from alcohol or
drug addiction, a rate two-to-three times higher than the population generally. See sources
cited in RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 8. Almost half of women
lawyers, and almost two-thirds of those working more than forty-five hours a week, report
that such stress levels have adverse effects on reproductive health. Marc B. Schenker et al.,
Self- Reported Stress and Reproductive Health of Female Lawyers, 39 J. OCCUPATIONAL &
ENVTL. MED. 556 (1997); see also Mary Beth Grover, Daddy Stress, FORBES, Sept. 6, 1999,
at 202 (noting problems for men). By contrast, adequate time for significant family
involvement helps to buffer problems experienced in the workplace and improves health and
performance. FAYE CROSBY, JUGGLING 86-67 (1991); David Chambers, Accommodation
and Satisfaction: Women and Men Lawyers and the Balance of Work and Family, 14 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 251, 254 (1991). For general discussion of the health costs of excessive
workloads, see JILL ANDRESKY FRASER, WHITE-COLLAR SWEATSHOP 36-37 (2001);
FAMILIES & WORK INST., FEELING OVERWORKED: WHEN WORK BECOMES TOO MUCH 5-8
(2001) [hereinafter FAMILIES & WORK INST., FEELING OVERWORKED].
91. It is estimated that substance abuse and mental health difficulties figure into sixty to
eighty percent of discipline and malpractice cases. See sources cited in DEBORAH L. RHODE
& DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 973 (2001). For general discussion of the effects of
overwork on job performance, see FAMILIES & WORK INST., FEELING OVERWORKED, supra
note 90, at 8.
92. For inflated time reports, see sources cited in RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE,
supra note 2, at 171; WILLIAM G. ROSS, THE HONEST HOUR: THE ETHICS OF TIME BILLING BY
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Overly demanding workloads and inflexible schedules impose further
costs in terms of early attrition. 93 Human relations studies find that
replacing professional workers typically costs between one to one-and-ahalf times their annual salary, and that the loss of an associate runs between
$200,000 to $500,000. 94 That average includes the direct expenses of
recruiting and retaining a replacement, but does not include intangible
losses in terms of disrupted relationships with clients and colleagues, and
diminished productivity while newly hired individuals acquire job-specific
knowledge. Although most firms have partnership structures that assume
substantial attrition, experts agree that current rates are not cost-effective,
and that the associates who leave early are not necessarily the ones that
employers want to lose. 95 Bar association studies and management
consultants consistently note that most associates do not begin to generate
profits until their third or fourth years. 96 At that point, almost half have left
their first employer, and quality of life concerns are a major reason,
particularly for women. 97 Excessive hours and inflexible schedules are a
major cause of glass ceilings for female attorneys, and the resulting lack of
gender equality and women mentors in positions of greatest status, security,
and influence. 98

ATTORNEYS 3-4 (1996); Lisa Lerman, Blue Chip Bilking: Regulation of Billing and Expense
Fraud by Lawyers, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 259-62 (1999); Henry Maute, A Problem
of Overbilling by Many Large Firms is Confirmed in Surveys, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 1993,
at B7. Some lawyers also “fake face time” by strategies such as calling themselves on an
office intercom late at night or changing time settings on their computer to send emails at
very late or early hours. Ross Guberman, Running from the Law, WASHINGTONIAN, Oct.
2001, at 51; Joan C. Williams et al., Better on Balance? The Corporate Counsel Work/Life
Report, 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 367, 392 (2004).
93. NALP, KEEPING THE KEEPERS: STRATEGIES FOR ASSOCIATE RETENTION IN TIMES OF
ATTRITION (1998) [hereinafter KEEPING THE KEEPERS]; Debra Baker, Cash and Carry
Associates, 85 A.B.A. J., May 1999, at 41.
94. RHODE, Balanced Lives, supra note 81, at 21; Joan Williams & Cynthia Thomas
Calvert, Balanced Hours: Effective Part-Time Policies for Washington Law Firms, 8 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 357, 361, 366 (2002) [hereinafter Williams & Calvert, Balanced
Hours]; Williams et al., supra note 92, at 377 (citing human relations experts for the one to
one and a half range); Patti Giglio, Rethinking the Hours, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 8, 2004, at 33
(quoting Joan Williams regarding associate costs).
95. NALP, KEEPING THE KEEPERS, supra note 93; Williams & Calvert, Balanced Hours,
supra note 94, at 367.
96. Rhode, Balanced Lives, supra note 81, at 20.
97. In the most recent survey by NALP, thirty-eight percent of associates left by the end
of their third year, and sixty percent by the end of their fifth year. NALP, BEYOND THE
BIDDING WAR: A STUDY OF ATTRITION, DEPARTURES, DESTINATIONS, AND WORKLOAD
INITIATIVES 17 (2001); see also Williams & Calvert, Balanced Hours, supra note 94, at 367.
98. JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER 71-73 (2000); BOSTON BAR ASS’N TASK
FORCE ON WORK-FAMILY CHALLENGES, FACING THE GRAIL: CONFRONTING THE COURSE OF
WORK FAMILY IMBALANCE 39 (1999); CATALYST, A NEW APPROACH TO FLEXIBILITY:
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Inadequate work/life policies also adversely affect recruitment. Recent
surveys find that most men as well as women indicate a willingness to take
lower salaries in exchange for more time with their families. 99 In a crossnational study of some 2,500 university students, over half identified
“attaining a balance between personal life and career” as their primary
professional goal. 100 Young lawyers similarly identify time for personal
life as one of their key concerns. 101 Those concerns are particularly great
for women with families, who still end up with a disproportionate share of
domestic tasks. 102 In a profession in which half the talent pool is now
female, workplace practices that devalue family values place employers at
a competitive disadvantage. A generation of female lawyers who grew up
expecting equal opportunity in the workplace is increasingly unwilling to
settle for less, or to give up satisfying personal and family lives to achieve
it.
By the same token, a wide array of evidence indicates that humane
hours, alternative work arrangements, and other family-friendly policies are
cost-effective strategies.
Such initiatives improve recruitment and

MANAGING THE WORK TIME EQUATION 20-21 (1997) [hereinafter CATALYST, NEW
APPROACH].
99. The Families and Work Institutes National Study of the Changing Workplace,
involving some 2,800 workers, found that workplace flexibility and family support was the
second most significant factor in job satisfaction, after job quality. Nearly two-thirds of all
workers would reduce their work week by an average of ten hours. Steven Ginsberg,
Raising Corporate Profits by Reaching Out to Families, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 1998, at
CMC; Sue Shellenbarger, Study of U.S. Workers Finds Sharp Rise Since 1992 in Desire to
Reduce Hours, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 1998, at A10. For discussion of the generational shift
in priorities within law and accounting firms as young men as well as women express
greater desire for time with their families, see FAMILIES & WORK INST., GENERATIONS AND
GENDER IN THE WORKPLACE (Oct., 2004) [hereinafter FAMILIES & WORK INST.,
GENERATIONS AND GENDER]. See Joan Williams, Canaries in the Mine: Work/Family
Culture and the Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2230-31 (2002) [hereinafter Williams, Canaries
in the Mine]; Bruce Baltestier, Mommy Track: No Career Derailment, N.Y.L.J., June 9,
2000, at 24; Terry Carter, Your Time or Your Money, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2001, at 26. One
survey by Harris Interactive and the Radcliffe Public Policy Center found that almost three
quarters of men in their middle thirties, compared to only a quarter of men over sixty-five,
would be willing to take lower salaries in exchange for more time available for their family.
Kirsten Downey Grimsley, Family: A Priority for Young Workers, WASH. POST, May 3,
2000, at E1.
100. Sue Shellenbarger, Work and Family: What Job Candidates Really Want to Know,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 1999, at B1.
101. FAMILIES & WORK INST., GENERATIONS AND GENDER, supra note 99, discussed in
Leigh Jones, Law Firms Mull the ‘Gen Y’ Equation, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 2, 2005, at A1. See
Williams & Calvert, Balanced Hours, supra note 94, at 370 (quoting NALP Director Paula
Patton about preferences of younger lawyers).
102. Edmund L. Andrews, Survey Confirms It: Women Outjuggle Men, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
15, 2004, at A22.
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retention, and help reduce stress and other health-related disorders.103
Some recent estimates suggest that every dollar invested in these policies
concerning quality of life results in two dollars saved in other costs.104
Other surveys find that part-time employees are generally more efficient
than full-time counterparts, particularly those clocking sweatshop hours,
and that any additional overhead expenses are more than offset by reduced
attrition. 105 In short, balanced lives boost bottom lines.
Confronting the Barriers to Balanced Lives
If the economic justification for balanced lives is so persuasive, the
obvious question is why the legal workplace so often fails to permit or
promote them. One explanation is that the priority placed on billable hours
has assumed symbolic as well as economic significance. Lawyers’
willingness to work extended schedules has become a proxy for harder to
measure qualities such as commitment, ambition, and reliability under
pressure. 106 In an increasingly competitive marketplace, the ability to offer
client service “24/7” has obvious value, and weeding out those with
different priorities may seem to make good economic sense. Moreover,
partners who advance to decision-making positions typically do so without
“special accommodation” and often believe that if they managed, so can
everyone else. 107 A pervasive attitude is captured in a New Yorker cartoon

103. FAMILIES & WORK INST., FEELING OVERWORKED, supra note 90, at 7-8, 55.
104. Richard Ellsberry, The Family Friendly Office, OFF. SYS., Mar. 1, 1999, at 42;
Mackenzie Carpenter, A Few Ounces of Prevention, PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE, June 5,
1998, at A1; Keith Cunningham, Note, Father Time: Flexible Work Arrangements and Law
Firms’ Failure of the Family, 53 STAN. L. REV. 967, 1004 (2001).
105. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 98, at 112; Williams, Canaries in the
Mine, supra note 99, at 2227; BOSTON BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON WORK-FAMILY
CHALLENGE, supra note 98, at 25; LOTTE BAILYN, BREAKING THE MOLD: MEN, WOMEN AND
TIME IN THE NEW CORPORATE WORLD 80-84 (1993); LINDA BRAY CHANOW, WOMEN’S BAR
ASS’N OF WASHINGTON, D.C., LAWYERS, WORK, AND FAMILY: A STUDY OF ALTERNATIVE
SCHEDULES AT LAW FIRMS IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 8 (2000); M. DIANE VOGT & LORIANN RICKARD, KEEPING GOOD LAWYERS: BEST PRACTICES TO CREATE CAREER
SATISFACTION 55 (2000).
106. Cynthia Fuchs Epstein & Caroll Seron, The Symbolic Meanings of Professional
Time, in LEGAL PROFESSIONS: WORK, STRUCTURES AND ORGANIZATION 79-94 (Jerry Van
Hoy ed., 2001); Renee M. Landers et al., Rat Race Redux: The Adverse Selection in the
Determination of Work Hours in Law Firms, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 329, 329 (1996); EPSTEIN
ET AL., THE PART-TIME PARADOX, supra note 87, at 56; BOSTON BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON
WORK-FAMILY CHALLENGE, supra note 98, at 31; Martha Neil, Lawyers Shun Firms’ Offer
of Part-Time Work, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Dec 8, 2000, at 22 (quoting Patton).
107. As one lawyer put in a study of glass ceilings in the New York bar, “I have a family.
I didn’t get time off to do that. Why should you?” Cynthia Epstein et al., Glass Ceilings
and Open Doors: Women’s Advancement in the Legal Profession, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 291,
409 (1995). For other examples of resistance, see NOSSEL & WESTFALL, supra note 89, at 9,
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featuring a well-heeled professional advising his younger colleague: “All
work and no play makes you a valued employee.” 108
Reduced hours or alternative schedules evoke resistance on other
grounds as well. Some lawyers are annoyed at having to schedule around
someone else’s personal needs. Other lawyers resent having to assume a
disproportionate share of travel, late assignments, or holiday work.
Backlash is especially likely if employers fail to make fair arrangements for
reallocation of part-time lawyers’ work, or limit alternative schedules to
parents. Attorneys who have no choice about working long hours become
understandably annoyed when forced to put in additional time because of
colleagues’ shorter workweek. 109
Further problems arise when lawyers on alternative schedules attempt to
mitigate such resentment by demonstrating “commitment” and consistently
exceeding their agreed-upon hours. The result of this “schedule creep” is
that home becomes work, “unexpected emergencies” become expected
events, and attorneys can end up with close to full-time work for part-time
pay. 110 Such inequities, together with the stigma and isolation that often
accompany a reduced schedule, discourage the vast majority of lawyers
from seeking it. Although about ninety-five percent of law firms have
policies that allow part-time work, only about four percent of lawyers in
fact work part-time. 111 Between seventy-five and ninety percent of
surveyed attorneys believe that taking a reduced schedule would jeopardize

44, 102, 126, 187, 251, 266, 277, 297; Williams & Calvert, Balanced Hours, supra note 94,
at 370; Amy Bach, Nolo Contendre, N.Y. MAG., Dec. 11, 1995, at 54; Jim Oliphant, X-ing
Out Tradition, BROWARD DAILY BUS. REV., Dec. 18, 1998, at 16; Amy Saltzman, Woman
vs. Woman, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 25, 1996, available at
http://www.usnews.com/biztech/articles/960325/archive_009948.htm (last visited Sept. 1,
2005).
108. Leo Cullum, cartoon, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 30, 1998, available at
http://www.cartoonbank.com (last visited Oct. 13, 2005).
109. Cynthia L. Cooper, Moms V. Non-Moms: Does Law Firm Culture Widen the Riff?,
PERSPECTIVES (A.B.A. Comm’n on Women in the Profession, Chicago, Ill.), Win.-Spr.
2002, at 8-9.
110. Rhode, Balanced Lives, supra note 81, at 24; Joan Williams & Cynthia Thomas
Calvert, Is Your Firm’s Part Time Program a Retention Tool?, LAW PRAC. MGMT., Apr.
2003, at 33, 34; Williams, Canaries in the Mine, supra note 99, at 2226; WOMEN’S BAR
ASS’N MASS., supra note 82, at 16; CATALYST, FLEXIBLE WORK ARRANGEMENTS 54 (2000);
Williams et al., supra note 92, at 416; Giglio, supra note 94, at 33; Sue Shellenbarger, Work
& Family, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2005, at D1.
111. See Marci Alboher Nusbaum, Lawyers Push to Keep the Office at Bay, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 7, 2003, at C13; Dianne Molvig, Balancing Work and Personal Life: Flexible Work
Options, WIS. LAW., Apr. 2004, at 10, 13; Paula A. Patton, Women Lawyers: Their Status,
Influence, and Retention in the Legal Profession, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 173, 180
(2005).
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their legal career and prospects for partnership.112
None of these obstacles to alternative work arrangements are
insurmountable. Such arrangements can include not only reduced hours,
but compressed or flexible schedules, and telecommuting. Contrary to
widespread perceptions, the research available does not find substantial
What clients want is
client resistance to these alternatives.113
responsiveness and continuity. If a lawyer working a non-traditional
schedule can address their needs within a reasonable time frame, or ensure
competent backup assistance from someone else, clients typically have no
objection. Indeed, they generally prefer such arrangements to the
retraining costs associated with high attrition. 114 Moreover, full-time
attorneys working excessive hours do not necessarily provide more
accessible or efficient service. As one in-house counsel noted, almost no
outside attorneys “will be devoted to our case one hundred percent, so why
should I care what they are doing the rest of their time, whether it is other
clients’ work or family? If they are not responsive, I’ll be upset; it doesn’t
matter why.” 115 And as other clients have pointed out, a part-time lawyer
on a cell phone from a playground may be more accessible than a full time
lawyer in a deposition for someone else’s case. 116
So too, firms can minimize the internal backlash from alternative
schedules by not limiting their availability to parents, and by designing
equitable plans for reallocating work. 117 Employers who have taken such
an approach generally have not found that it “opens the floodgates” to

112. CATALYST, WOMEN IN LAW: MAKING THE CASE 19 (2001). See Martha Neil,
Working 9-5, or 10-3, or 1-4 . . ., A.B.A. J., Dec. 2003 (quoting NALP director about
partnership perceptions), at http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/1203ca.html (last visited
Oct. 13, 2005); Jennifer Martin, Part-Time Lawyers Suffer Overwork: Are Perceived as
LEADER,
Sept.
2001,
available
at
Being
Less
Devoted,
BAR
http://www.abanet.org/barserv/overwork.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2005); Williams &
Calvert, Balanced Hours, supra note 94, at 375 (discussing perceptions about partnership
and advancement); Williams, Canaries in the Mine, supra note 99, at 2225-26 (discussing
stigma).
113. Williams et al., supra note 92, at 445-47 (noting that all but a handful of
interviewees did not object to such schedules, and many supported them as a way to reduce
turnover); Williams and Calvert, Balanced Hours, supra note 94, at 372 (noting clients’
desire for policies that reduce turnover); Molvig, supra note 111, at 13, 54 (quoting
managing partner James Sandman regarding client preferences).
114. Molvig, supra note 111, at 10, 14; Williams, Canaries in the Mine, supra note 99, at
2229.
115. Williams et al., supra note 92, at 445-46 (quoting unidentified attorney).
116. Rhode, Balanced Lives, supra note 81, at 20; see also Williams et al., supra note 92,
at 445-46.
117. Williams et al., supra note 92, at 425-26; Rhode, Balanced Lives, supra note 81, at
34.
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arrangements that are unprofitable for the firm or unacceptable to clients.118
Thousands of organizations, both in law and comparable professional
settings, function effectively with policies that were once assumed to be
unworkable and unaffordable. 119
IV. PROFITS AND PRIORITIES
In THE PARADOX OF SUCCESS, John O’Neil notes that monetary success
brings many rewards, but not necessarily the ability to enjoy them. 120 For
lawyers, the priority on profits may often be self defeating; it can squeeze
out time for family, friends, public service, and personal interests that
would ultimately prove more satisfying than the incremental income
generated by excessive workloads. Particularly in large firms, the ultimate
achievement, full equity partnership, typically promises no reprieve from
the punishing schedules that preceded it. As a hiring partner at Covington
& Burling once put it, the promotion process is similar to a “pie-eating
contest where the prize is more pie.”121
Income and Satisfaction
In fact, considerable evidence indicates that such reward structures are
not the best route to professional satisfaction. Money plays a much smaller
role in promoting personal satisfaction than is commonly assumed.
Americans’ income, controlled for inflation, is twice what it was in the late
1950s, but fewer report being very happy and more objective evidence
concerning mental health difficulties also suggests a decline in wellbeing. 122 Researchers consistently find that for individuals at lawyers’
income levels, differences in compensation bear relatively little relationship
to differences in satisfaction. 123 Individuals earning $200,000 are not

118. Rhode, Balanced Lives, supra note 81, at 41.
119. Id.; Williams et al., supra note 92, at 378-79.
120. JOHN R. O’NEIL, THE PARADOX OF SUCCESS 26-31 (2004).
121. Marie Beaudette, Associates Leave Firm in Droves, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 6, 2003, at A1
(quoting Mark Plotkin).
122. GREGG EASTERBROOK, THE PROGRESS PARADOX 164 (2003); BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS,
CENSUS
OF
POPULATION
AND
HOUSING,
2002,
available
at
http://govinfo.library.orst.edu/stateis.html/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2005); Schiltz, supra note
84, at 881-89.
123. David G. Myers & Ed Diener, Who is Happy?, 6 PSYCHOL. SCI. 12, 13 (1995);
JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERSPENT AMERICAN 9 (1998); ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER
72, 112-113 (1999); Matthew Herper, Money Won’t Buy You Happiness, FORBES, Sept. 21,
2004,
available
at
http://www.forbes.com/technology/sciences/2004/09/21/cx_mh_0921happiness.html (last
visited Nov. 25, 2005).
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significantly happier than those earning half that much. 124 There is also no
relationship between compensation and fulfillment across different fields of
practice. Discontent is greatest among well-paid large firm associates and
least pronounced among relatively low-earning academics, public interest,
and public sector employees. 125
One reason for this disconnect between wealth and satisfaction is that
most of what high incomes can buy does not yield enduring happiness.
Desires, expectations, and standards of comparison tend to increase as
rapidly as they are satisfied. As psychologists note, the transitory pleasure
that comes through non-essential purchases is less critical in promoting
well-being than other factors, such as individuals’ relationship with
families, friends, and communities, and their sense of contributing to larger
societal ends. 126
Self-Defeating Dynamics
Yet several dynamics converge to trap lawyers into choices that
overvalue income. One dynamic involves the difficulty of downward
economic mobility. Attorneys who initially chose well-paying jobs in
order to gain training and prestige, or to pay off student loans, often
become habituated to the lifestyle that such positions make possible.127 So
too, the work required to generate high income creates a heightened sense
of deprivation that fuels heightened demands. Attorneys working
sweatshop hours feel entitled to goods and services that will make their
lives easier and more pleasurable.
This pattern of compensatory
consumption can become self-perpetuating. As one refugee from large
firm practice notes, lawyers frequently use the “substantial income from
their jobs in an attempt to fill the voids created by their jobs.”128 Part of
the reason many professionals accept grueling schedules is to afford
“extras” for themselves or their families that they have little time to enjoy.
Yet luxuries can readily become necessities and prevent attorneys from

124. Robert E. Lane, Does Money Buy Happiness?, 113 PUB. INT. 56, 61, 63 (1993);
FRANK, supra note 123, at 183.
125. NALP FOUND. & THE AMERICAN BAR FOUND., supra note 66, at 8, 10; BOSTON BAR
ASS’N TASK FORCE ON PROF. FULFILLMENT, EXPECTATIONS, REALITY, & RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR CHANGE, Aug. 15, 1997, available at http://www.bostonbar.org/prs/fulfillment.htm.
126. MARTIN E. P. SELIGMAN, AUTHENTIC HAPPINESS 9 (2002) (arguing that pleasure is
less related to enduring happiness than engagement in relationships and a sense of meaning,
which involves using personal capacities to make a broader societal contribution); Herper,
supra note 123.
127. O’NEIL, supra note 120, at 132; WILLIAM R. KEATES, PROCEED WITH CAUTION 12627 (1997).
128. KEATES, supra note 127, at 126.
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opting for a more satisfying balance of personal, professional, and public
service pursuits.
A desire for relative status pushes in a similar and equally corrosive
direction. For many individuals, including lawyers, money is a key
measure of achievement and self-esteem, and spending money is a way to
signal success and social status. The desire to impress and display is
deeply rooted in human nature, and in America’s increasingly materialist
culture, self-worth is linked to net worth. 129 Income is, to large extent, a
“positional good;” individuals’ perceptions of their own pay depends on its
position relative to others. 130 The frequently public nature of personal
salaries has made the competition for relative status easier to play and
harder to win. 131 As economists note, this kind of arms race has few
winners and many losers. There is, in fact, no room at the top. “Addictive
ambition” fuels desires not readily satisfied.132 Attorneys who look hard
enough can always find someone getting something more.
These dynamics skew the priorities not only of individual lawyers but
also of the firms that employ them. Because money is at the top of almost
everyone’s scale, it is easier to reach consensus on maximizing
compensation than on other values such as reducing hours or subsidizing
substantial pro bono commitments. Firms that sacrifice profits for other
workplace satisfactions risk losing talented rainmakers and recruits who
prefer greater earnings. Once high pay scales are established, they are
difficult to dislodge. Downward mobility is painful, and the working
conditions necessary to sustain such incomes then encourage the sense of
deprivation and entitlement that fuel desires for further financial
compensation. Even attorneys who initially entered the profession with
modest financial aspirations and strong social justice commitments often
become trapped in these reward cycles. If these lawyers cannot afford to
do the kind of public-interest work that they would really like, they want at
least to be very well paid for what they are doing.

129. For a discussion of the need to impress, see RICHARD CONNIFF, A NATURAL HISTORY
145 (2002).
130. Robert H. Frank, How Not to Buy Happiness, DAEDALUS, Spr. 2004, at 69, 79.
131. As Steven Brill, the former editor of the AMERICAN LAWYER, has noted, once legal
periodicals began comparing law firm salaries, “suddenly all it took for a happy partner
making $250,000 to become a malcontent was to read that at the firm on the next block a
classmate was pulling down $300,000.” Steven Brill, “Ruining” the Profession, AM. LAW.,
July-Aug. 1996, at 5.
132. ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER TAKE-ALL SOCIETY 41 (1995);
O’NEIL, supra note 120, at 29-30; KEATES, supra note 127, at 144; SCHOR, supra note 123,
at 5-12; Mike Papantonio, Legal Egos on the Loose, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1999, at 108.
OF THE RICH
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V. STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE
Changing the culture of law firm practice will require strategies on
multiple levels. Leaders of firms need to recognize all the ways in which
ethics pays and ethics counts, and must restructure their policies
accordingly. Leaders in the profession need to do more to insure that ethics
does in fact pay, and to provide rewards and recognition for firms that meet
best practice standards on issues involving ethics compliance, pro bono
service, and balanced lives. And leaders in legal education need to devote
more attention in their teaching and research to institutionalizing ethical
values.
Law Firms
One consistent finding of research on organizational culture is the
significance of ethical commitment among those in leadership positions.133
Leaders set a moral tone and a moral example by their own behavior.134
Workers take cues about appropriate behavior from those in supervisory
positions. Whether employees believe that leaders care about principles as
much as profits significantly affects the frequency of ethical conduct.135
Whether leaders actively convey support for pro bono service and balanced
lives is also critical in institutionalizing those values, and in realizing their
benefits in recruitment, retention, and productivity. 136 Consistency
between words and practices is particularly important.137 Core values need
to shape day-to-day decisions concerning promotion, compensation,
133. PAINE, VALUE SHIFT, supra note 5, at 249; Linda Klebe Treviño et al., Managing
Ethics and Legal Compliance: What Works and What Hurts, 41 CAL. MGMT. REV. 131, 14243 (1999) [hereinafter Treviño et al., Managing Ethics and Legal Compliance]; Lynn
Sharpe Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, HARV. BUS. REV., March-Apr. 1994,
at 106, 113; CHRISTINE PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION: EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION
AND DEMOCRACY 50, 94, 203 (2002).
134. Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Corporations and
Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron’s Demise, 35
RUTGERS L.J. 1, 10-11 (2003); Chris Moon & Clive Bonny, Attitudes and Approaches, in
BUSINESS ETHICS 34 (Chris Moon & Clive Bonny eds., 2001); Michael Hoffman,
Integrating Ethics into Business Cultures, in BUSINESS ETHICS, supra note 134, at 43-44, 51.
135. Treviño et al., Managing Ethics and Legal Compliance, supra note 133, at 142;
Heesun Wee, Corporate Ethics: Right Makes Might, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Apr. 11, 2002
(describing
findings
of
Ethics
Research
Center
2000
Survey),
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/apr2002/nf20020411_6350.htm (last visited
Nov. 25, 2005).
136. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE, supra note 57, at 30; Williams, Canaries in the
Mine, supra note 99, at 2234-35; Williams et al., supra note 92, at 433-36.
137. Vicky Arnold et al., Understanding the Factors Underlying Ethical Organizations:
Enabling Continuous Ethical Improvement, 15 J. APPLIED BUS. RES. 1, 10 (1999); Moon &
Bonny, supra note 134, at 29-34; Hoffman, supra note 134, at 50.
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performance evaluation, and billable hour requirements.
So, for example, to maintain an ethical workplace, firms need effective
structures for raising and addressing ethical issues, as well as strategies for
evaluating the adequacy of those structures. Systematic information is
necessary concerning the nature and frequency of perceived ethical
problems and the appropriateness of organizational responses. Do lawyers
feel able to raise ethical concerns about clients, colleagues, and supervisors
without risking adverse personal consequences? How well does the firm
follow up on reports of possible misconduct? These are key factors in
creating an ethical workplace climate, and too few legal employers have
made serious attempts to assess them. 138
On issues of pro bono contributions, law firms must ensure a closer
relationship between professed values and daily practices. In theory,
virtually all firms support such public service, but only a quarter fully count
it toward meeting billable hour requirements, and only ten percent of
surveyed lawyers believe that it is valued the same as paying work. 139 The
inadequacy of current policies suggests obvious directions for reform. My
own study identified best practices such as:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

a formal pro bono policy;
visible commitment by the organization’s leadership;
credit for pro bono work toward billable hour requirements;
consideration of pro bono service as a favorable factor in
promotion and compensation decisions;
recognition and showcasing of service;
a pro bono committee or coordinator that matches participants
with appropriate placements and ensures adequate training,
supervision, and performance; and
compliance with the Law Firm Pro Bono Challenge of three
percent or five percent of billable hours or the ABA Model
Rules’ standard of fifty hours per lawyer per year or the
financial equivalent. 140

In determining what qualifies as “pro bono publico,” firms should
138. The same is true of business organizations. See Treviño et al., Managing Ethics and
Legal Compliance, supra note 133, at 143-48; TREVIÑO & WEAVER, MANAGING ETHICS,
supra note 16, at 224, 272; Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, supra note 133, at
113.
139. See RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE, supra note 57, at 138, 140, and text
accompanying notes 68 and 73 supra.
140. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE, supra note 57, at 169.
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include only work that in fact focuses on the public good, not the concerns
of family, friends, supervising partners, or deadbeat paying clients.
A comparable range of reforms is necessary on issues involving
balanced lives. As noted earlier, excessive hours and inadequate
alternatives are a widespread problem. Organizations such as the ABA
Commission on Women in the Profession, Catalyst, and the Project on
Attorney Retention at American University College of Law have proposed
a variety of correctives, such as:
•
•
•
•

reasonable billable hour standards that can accommodate
significant family, pro bono service, and other personal
commitments;
broad eligibility for alternative schedules, including reduced
time, flexible hours, compressed workweeks, and
telecommuting,
proportionate compensation and benefits for lawyers on reduced
schedules;
monitoring structures designed to minimize the risks associated
with alternative schedules, such as poor quality assignments,
lack of promotion opportunities, and workloads routinely
exceeding agreed limits. 141

Firms should also seek systematic information about work/life concerns
from lawyers who are leaving the firm as well as those who remain.
Clients, Courts, and Bar Associations
Related strategies should focus on providing more incentives for law
firms to adopt adequate ethics, pro bono, and work/life initiatives. For
example, bar associations could promulgate best practice standards on
these issues and publicize the firms that comply. Courts or bar associations
could also require legal employers to report information on at least some of
these matters. After Florida instituted a pro bono reporting requirement,
lawyers’ volunteer hours and financial contributions grew substantially.142
141. Williams, Canaries in the Mine, supra note 99, at 2234-37; Williams et al., supra
note 92, at 423-32; Rhode, Balanced Lives, supra note 81, at 23-24; Rhode, Balanced Lives
for Lawyers, supra note 81, at 2219. For a general approach to improving performance on
gender-related issues see CATALYST, MAKING CHANGE: CREATING A BUSINESS-ALIGNED
DIVERSITY SCORECARD (2005); and ERNST & YOUNG, SUPPORT FOR WOMEN’S LEADERSHIP,
available
at
http://www.ey.com/global/Content.nsf/US/About_Ernst_Young__Center_New_Workforce (last visited Nov. 25, 2005).
142. Judith L. Maute, Pro Bono Publico in Oklahoma: Time for Change, 53 OKLA. L.
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Similar progress has resulted from corporate clients’ demand for
information on racial and ethnic diversity in firms that they are considering
as outside counsel. 143 But few corporate clients, only three percent in one
recent survey, have required information about the pro bono involvement
of firms that are seeking legal work. 144 Experience in other nations
suggests that public service contributions would increase if more clients
considered those contributions in selecting their lawyers.145
Public or private sector organizations that purchase substantial amounts
of legal services could also make pro bono commitments a condition of
representation. For example, in California, some municipalities, as well as
the state government, include such provisions in contracts for legal services
that exceed a specified amount.146 Local governments in other nations not
only consider pro bono efforts, but also require a percentage of the profits
on their legal work to be used for charitable legal activities.147
More rewards and recognition should also go to firms with effective
work/life policies. Pressure from clients would serve their own economic
interests; they do not get cost-effective services from bleary, burned-out
lawyers working sweatshop hours. The challenge remaining is to enable
and encourage clients, as well as job applicants, to consider work/life issues
when choosing among law firms. Publicizing firms’ records concerning
billable hour quotas and alternative schedules could assist that process.

REV. 527 (2000) (noting the effects of pro bono amendments in twenty-two states and the
District of Columbia); A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON PRO BONO AND PUBLIC SERVICE, STATE
PRO BONO REPORTING: A GUIDE FOR BAR LEADERS AND OTHERS CONSIDERING STRATEGIES
FOR EXPANDING PRO BONO, Aug. 1999; Kellie Isbell & Sarah Sawle, Pro Bono Publico:
Voluntary Service and Mandatory Reporting, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 845, 860-61 (2002).
143. For examples, see LAWYERS FOR ONE AMERICA, BAR NONE: REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE STATUS OF PEOPLE OF COLOR AND PRO BONO
SERVICES IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 30-31, 45-46 (2000); ELIZABETH CHAMBLISS, A.B.A.
COMM’N ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY, MILES TO GO 2000: PROGRESS OF MINORITIES IN
THE LEGAL PROFESSION ix (2004); BAR ASS’N OF SAN FRANCISCO, GOALS AND TIMETABLES
FOR MINORITY HIRING AND ADVANCEMENT (2000).
144. Press release, Corp. Pro Bono Org., Survey Shows In-House Counsel Take an
Interest
in
Pro
Bono
(Mar.
25,
2002),
http://corporateprobono.org/news/displayNews.cfm?newsID=1150 (last visited Nov. 25,
2005).
145. For efforts by the Solicitors’ Pro Bono Group in Great Britain, see RHODE, PRO
BONO IN PRINCIPLE, supra note 57, at 107; Clients Put Pressure on Firms to Undertake Pro
Bono Work, LAWYER, Mar. 15, 2004, 13.
146. 2001 Cal. Stat. ch. 880, § 3 (AB 913) (amending CAL. BUS. & PROF., § 6072,
effective Jan. 1, 2003. Shannon Lafferty, Santa Clara to Require Pro Bono from Firms,
S.F. RECORDER, Apr. 11, 2002, at 2.
147. See RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE, supra note 57, at 110 for discussion of an
Australian government requirement; see also Jason Silverii, Government Releases Pro Bono
Guidelines, L. INST. J., May 2003, at 22.
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Law Schools
Further incentives for best practices in these areas could come from law
schools. They could, for example, require legal employers who use
campus placement facilities to disclose their pro bono and work/life
policies, their employees’ annual public service contributions, and the
usage rates of alternative work schedules. Such information could also
become part of national databases, directories, and media ranking
systems. 148 Analogous reporting requirements could also be developed for
the law schools themselves. Although ABA accreditation standards require
schools to provide appropriate pro bono service opportunities, many
institutions neither keep nor disclose specific information on participation
rates. The best available information indicates that most students graduate
without a law-related pro bono experience.149 That record might improve
if schools were required to disclose information on their student
involvement as part of the accreditation process, or as a condition for
membership in the Association of American Law Schools.
Messages about legal ethics, pro bono service, and balanced lives also
need to be reinforced throughout the law school culture. Although issues
of professional responsibility arise in all areas of legal practice, they are
missing or marginal in most of legal education. Even less attention focuses
on pro bono activities. One of the most dispiriting findings of my recent
survey was that only one percent of surveyed attorneys recalled any
discussion of pro bono responsibilities in their law school legal ethics
courses or orientation programs. 150 Similar gaps occur with respect to
work/life balance and its importance for the health and well-being of
practitioners.151 When evaluating career choices, students often have little
grasp of what current billable hours requirements entail on a continuing
basis and what other values may fall by the wayside.152 All too often, legal
education is silent on crucial issues facing students about how to structure a
meaningful professional life. Correctives are obvious. Core courses can

148. The A-List, AM. LAW., Sept. 1, 2005, at 84 (basing list on profitability, diversity,
associate satisfaction, and pro bono work).
149. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE, supra note 57, at 24.
150. Id. at 162.
151. Leading professional responsibility casebooks often provide no coverage of these
issues. For exceptions, see DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS, supra note
91, at 79-88; GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 109091 (4th ed. 2004).
152. For discussion of law students’ ignorance about the actual number of working hours
needed to meet firm quotas, see generally Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work
Like a Machine: The Dissonance Between Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. CAL. L. REV.
1231 (1991).
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include discussion of ethical issues and prominent pro bono cases,
placement offices can showcase firms that comply with best practice
standards on public service and work/life balance; and the administration
can highlight these issues in extracurricular programs.
Law professors’ research agendas reflect comparable omissions.
Systematic studies of ethical compliance, pro bono practices, and work/life
initiatives are noticeable for their absence. On the whole, legal educators
have done far too little to educate themselves, their students, and their
practitioner colleagues on crucial questions of professional values. We
cannot afford to treat such issues of professional responsibility as someone
else’s responsibility.
Sigmund Freud began his classic account of Civilization and its
Discontents with the observation that: “It is impossible to escape the
impression that people commonly use false standards of measurement: that
they seek power, success, and wealth for themselves and admire them in
others, and that they underestimate what is of true value in life.”153
Lawyers are no exception. This symposium is a welcome opportunity to
redirect our attention to core values and their role in law firm practice.

153. SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION
1960).
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